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ABSTRACT
When Arthur Laffer or other "supply side advocates" plot total tax revenue
as a function of a particular tax rate, he draws an upward sloping segment called
the normal range, followed by a downward sloping segment called the prohibitive range.
Since a given revenue can be obtained with either of two tax rates, government would
minimize total burden by choosing the lower rate of the normal range. A brief
literature review indicates that tax rates on the prohibitive range in theoretical
and empirical models have been the result of particularly high tax rates, high
elasticity parameters, or both. Looking at labor tax rates and total revenue, for
example, the tax rate which maximizes revenue will depend on the assumed labor
supply elasticity. This paper introduces a new curve which sunimarizes the tax rate
and elasticity combinations that result in maximum revenues, separating the "normal
area" from the "prohibitive area." A general—purpose empirical U.S. general equi-
librium model is used to plot the Laffer curve for several elasticities, and to plot
the newly introduced curve using the labor tax example. Results indicate that the
U.S. could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive area, but that the tax wedge
and/or labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher than most estimates
would suggest.
Don Fullerton





Ever since Arthur B. Laffer first drew his famous curve on a napkin in
a Washington restaurant five years ago, there has been considerable public
debate about the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates
and government revenue. Pictured in Figure 1, the curve plots total revenue
against the tax rate and claims to show that there are two rates at which a
given revenue can be collected. The upward sloping portion of the curve is
called the "nol" range and the downward sloping segment is the "prohibi-
tive" range. No rational government would knowingly operate on the latter
range in the long run, but with adjustment lags and a high discount rate such
tax rates might be used in the short run. The prohibitive range is said to
exist because the high tax rates stifle economic activity, force agents to
barter, and encourage leisure pursuits. It is also made plausible by remem-




The debate has been conducted mostly in the spheres of pQlitics and
journalism, and it includes a wide variety of unsupported claims and opinions.
These range all the way from the assertion that the prohibitive range does
not exist to the claim that "we are well within this range at present."--'
Simple theoretical models can show that the prohibitive range does indeed
exist, but the U. S. position on the curve Is clearly an empirical matter.
Despite the obvious importance of this issue for fiscal policy, there has been
no serious estimation of the curve using an economic model.-' This paper
attempts to correct this deficiency by using a general equilibrium taxation
model to address two questions. First, what is the position of the U. S.
on the curve today? Second, what is the relationship between the location
of the curve itself and critical parameters like the appropriate factor sup-
ply elasticity?!
The next section offers a brief review of some salient points from the
debate. A common aspect of previous studies is that a prohibitive range for
some local or non—U. S. economy is always associated with particularly high
tax rates, high factor supply elasticities, or both. The third section sets
out the conditions under which a lower tax rate could result in higher revenues.
These conditions are summarized in a new curve, plotting the appropriate factor
supply elasticity against the tax rate. The fourth section describes the
general equilibrium model used to simulate the effects of various tax rates.
These estimations are performed in section five, and the two curves are plot-
ted for an example with a labor tax and labor supply elasticity. Section six
provides Some evidence on the value of the critical labor supply elasticity,
and the last section concludes that to operate in the prohibitive range, the
taxwedgemust be very high or the factor supply elasticity must be very high,—3—
or there must be some combination of the two.
2. A Brief Literature Review
The idea of an inverse relationship between tax rates and revenue is not
entirely new. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776) could hardly be
more explicit:
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption
of the taxed commodities, and sometimes byencouraging
smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to govern-
ment than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.
(Book V, Chapter II)
The trade literature, as exemplified by Caves and Jones (1973), has
always understood the existence of a revenue maximizing tariff. This pre—
Laffer edition contains a hump—shaped tariff revenue curve which looks just
like Figure 1. With respect to internal taxes, Jules Dupuit in 1844 states:
By thus gradually Increasing the tax it will reach a
level at which the yield is at a maximum ... Beyond,
the yield of tax diminishes ...Lastlya tax (which
is prohibitive) will yield nothing.
After the introduction of the Laffer curve (or perhaps the reintroduction
of the Smith—Dupuit curve) in 1974, the quality of debate deteriorates sig-
nificantly. Jude Wanniski (1978) chronicles every fiscal catastrophe from the
fall of the Roman Empire to the Great Depression and attributes each of them
to some tax hike occurring within a few years in either direction. At various
points in his analysis Wanniski suggests (a) that the mere existence of a
prohibitive range implies taxes should be reduced, (b) that the peak of the
curve is at a 25 percent tax rate, and (c) that the peak of the curve "is the
point at which the electorate desires to be taxed".-' The welfare maximizing
government would operate somewhere on the normal range with the size of its
budget determined by standard cost—benefit analysis.—4—
For the opposition, Kiefer (1978) asserts that there is no tax rate for
the overall economy which can be measured on the horizontal axis, and that
"the Laffer Curve represents a gross simplification of a major portion of
macro—economics into a single curved line." These arguments are not compel-
ling, either, in view of the large number of economic models which oversimplify
in order to comprehend and convey economic phenomena. Kiefer also begrudges
the supply—side concentration, reminding us that income and substitution ef-
fects tend to be offsetting. "By concentrating primarily on incentive and
supply—side effects, the Laffer Curve largely ignores the actual mechanism
by which fiscal policy exerts its biggest and most immediate impact ——demand
side effects." One gets the feeling that these antagonists are talking past
one another, using different models that are not comparable. Take for example
the claim that the existence of a prohibitive range implies a marginal pro-
pensity to consume of greater than one. This Keynesian wisdom considers re-
ductions of noridistorting taxes and ignores the incentive effects central to
the supply—side argument.'
Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1978) build a simple equilibrium model with
one output, two factors, and a labor/leisure choice on the part of consumers.
Their utility function includes discounted consumption and leisure of each
future period, a formulation which is very similar to the larger empirical
general equilibrium model used later in this paper. Another similarity is
that capital is inelastically supplied in any one period, but can grow over
time. Labor taxes in these models place a wedge between the wage paid by pro-
ducers and net wage received by workers. Each individual reacts to this wedge
with an income effect and a substitution effect. In their model, however,
government revenues are returned through transfers or used to buy goods which
are perfect substitutes for private goods. This modelling cancels out the—5—
income effect and leaves the economy with an unambiguously positive substi-
tution effect and upward sloping labor supply. There are three points raised
by this modelling. The first point, recognized by these authors, is that if
transfers are given to individuals other than those whopay taxes, and if in-
dividuals have different preferences, then income effects do notnecessarily
cancel. The second point is that if a government does nothing other than
place a distorting wedge into the labor/leisure choice with a lump—sum rebate
of revenues, then welfare should indeed unambiguously decrease. These authors
have not allowed for any positive contribution of agovernment budget. Their
model does not account for the inherent efficiency gain associated withcor-
recting market failure by providing a public good. Thirdly, they fail to
allow for any complementarity between private and publicoutputs. Clearly
there are public goods such a police protection and transportationsystems which
act to encourage private production, more than offsetting the adverse effects
of the necessary tax wedge. Since the effects of a combined taxwedge and
labor complementing public good may be offsetting, the t1balanced budget"
labor supply curve does not have to be upward sloping as these authors insist.
The aggregate uncompensated labor supply elasticitymay be positive or nega-
tive, and econometric estimates of this value will be surveyed in a later
section.21
In empirical work, Grieson et al (1977) find thepossibility of an inverse
relationship between tax rates and revenue for local government in New York.
"The inclusion of state taxes lost when economicactivity leaves both the city
and state would ... raisethe possibility of a net revenue loss as a result
of an increase in business income taxes." They find thatthe nonmanufacturing
sector has fewer alternatives to the New York City location and shouldbe taxed
more heavily relative to the manufacturing sector whoseresponse to tax is more
elastic. Grieson (1979) finds the two sectors reversed forPhiladelphia, where—6—
nonmanufacturing is under greater competitive pressure. Still, "Phila-
delphia may have been at or very close to the revenue maximizing point
before the recent income tax increase, which raises the possibility of it
having been in excess of the socially optimal one."
Finally, Charles Stuart (1979) uses a fairly simple two sector model to
find that the current 80% marginal tax wedge in Sweden exceeds their revenue
maximizing rate by 10%. Sweden's high tax rates encourage barter and non—
market activity, placing the economy on the prohibitive range.
3. Another Simple Curve
A common feature of arguments from both sides of the debate is anim—
plicit or explicit reference to factor supply elasticities. Offsetting in-
come and substitution effects merely imply that the relevant unèoinpensated
supply elasticity might be low or negative. The emphasis on large incentives
in the supply—side argument implies a large elasticity. The open nature of
a local economy implies mobile factors and a more elastic response to a local
tax. Indeed, the entire debate reduces to the empirical matter of determin-
ing the relevant parameter values. If supply elasticies are high enough, the
economy could be on the prohibitive range.
The very location of Laffer's curve in the rate—revenue space of Figure 1
depends on the supply elasticity of the factor being taxed.-' If that elas-
ticity were fairly low, the total revenue maximizing point would be at a higher
tax rate for that factor, and conversely. One can imagine a third diin.ension
on that diagram giving different elasticity values. The hill would then be
converted into a ridge, running from a low tax rate and high elasticity com-
bination to a high rate and' low elasticity pair. The crest of that ridge is
plotted in Figure 2. Everything to the southwest of that curve signifies the—7—
"normal area", where raising rates gain revenue, and northeast of the curve
is the "prohibitive area", where no rational government would knowingly
operate. Each point on the curve shows the tax rate which maximizes total
revenue for a given elasticity.-'
At an infinite supply elasticity, the government cannot acquire additional
revenue by taxing that factor, and the maximum total revenue would be obtained
elsewhere (a zero tax rate for that factor is best). For a large finite
elasticity, the tax rate would have to be very low to remain in the normal
range, reflecting a general result from the optimal tax literature. As
this elasticity decreases, higher tax rates will maximize revenues. Finally,
at a zero (compensated) elasticity, the tax is nondistorting, and the only











From this description, we can place all the advocates on a cQmpre—
hensible spectrum: those who say we are in the prohibitive area believe
that the relevant elasticity and/or tax rate are higher, those who say we are
in the normal area believe they are lower, and those who deny the existence
of the inverse relationship must believe that the uncompensated supply elas-
ticity is zero or negative.
4. The General Equilibrium Model
To simulate the effects of different tax rates for a variety of factor
supply elasticities, a previously developed general equilibrium taxation model
is used. This model is still evolving after several years of work, and it
has already been used for other purposes including the evaluation of various
tax reform proposals. However, it was built as a general purpose model, and
its features are surprisingly well suited for this application. No adjust-
ments were required to obtain the following estimates. Since more thorough
descriptions of the model are available elsewhere, I give only an essential
10/ outlineof it here.—
The economy is divided into nineteen profit maximizing producers, f if—
teen consumption commodities, and twelve consumers differentiated by income
class. Each industry has a Cobb—Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitu-
tion (CES) production function, where the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is chosen as a "best—guess" value from evidence in the
literature. Each output can be used as a intermediate input through a fixed
coefficient input—output matrix. Outputs can be purchased by government, used
for investment, or converted into consumer goods. There is also a simple
foreign trade sector, though this model of the U. S. economy should be con-
sidered closed for these purposes.—9--
Each consumer has initial endowments of labor and capital services which
can be sold for use in production. Because of perfect factor mobility and
competition, the net—of—tax return to each factor is equal among industries.
A consumer can also choose to buy some of his own labor endowment for leisure.
The capital stock is fixed in any one period, but the dynamic version of the
model allows the savings response to augment the stock in later periods. De-
mand functions are based on CES utility functions with double nesting. The
choice between present and future consumption is represented by the outside
nest, and the elasticity of substitution between those two groups is based
on an estimate of the uncompensated savings elasticity with respect to the
net—of—tax rate of return. For this value we use 0.4 as found by Boskin
(1978). The breakdown of present consumption into commodities and leisure
is represented by the inside nest, and the elasticity of substitution between
those two groups is based on an estimate of the uncompensated labor supply
elasticity with respect to the net—of—tax wage. For this value we typically
use 0.15, but relationships for different labor elasticity values will be
derived below.
The various Federal, state, and local taxes are typically modelled as
ad valorem tax rates. on purchases of appropriate products or factors. Corpor-
ate income taxes and property taxes are modelled as different effective rates
of tax on use of capital by industry. Social security, workmen's compensation
and unemployment insurance appear as taxes on use of labor. These rates dif-
fer by industry partly because different proportions of workers hit the social
security maximum, but they average 10% of payments to labor. Personal income
taxes operate as different linear schedules for each consumer group, with
marginal tax rates increasing from an average of 17.forthe lowest income
group, to an average marginal tax rate of 40% for the highest income group.— 10—
Themodel is parameterized for 1973 using data from the National Income
and Product Accounts, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure
Survey, and the Treasury Department's Merged Tax File. These data are ad-
justed for known inaccuracies of government collection procedures and for
general equilibrium consistency requirements. This "benchmark" data set is
used to solve backwards for relevant preference parameters and tax rates, so
that the model solution can replicate the benchmark equilibrium. The user
can specify different tax rates to recalculate a simulated equilibrium with
different resource allocations for comparison with the benchmark. The model
is solved using a variant of Scarf's algorithm for an equilibrium price vector
where excess demands and profits are zero.V
The model does not include involuntary unemployment, inflation per Se,
or other aspects of disequilibria. It measures real effects without a money
equation, expressing all prices in relative terms. Voluntary unemployment
is captured through the labor/leisure choice, however, and the interaction of
inflation with effective tax rates is modelled by adjusting those rates appro—
priately)-" The model thus concentrates on microeconomic behavior and can
meet the supply—side advocates on their own ground.
A potential difference, however, is our modelling of government transfers
as essentially lump—sum payments to consumer groups in proportion to their
observed 1973 receipts from social security, unemployment compensation, food
stamps, and other welfare programs. Supply—side advocates may like to model
these payments as additional work disincentives, increasing the wedge between
labor's marginal product and leisure's implicit price. Though the government
does not intend to subsidize leisure, some programs do have that effect. The
Incentive depends on the program's ability to isolate important characteristics
such as age, disability, and number of dependents which make the recipient un—— 11—
ableto work. If successful, the payments will have more income effect and
less substitution effect. To the extent that the reader wishes to use a larger
wedge in the following simulations, a higher tax rate can be used in describ-
ing the current U. S. economy)1'
5. Estimation
Supply—side advocates refer to several different types of taxes when they
claim an inverse relationship between a particular tax rate and government
revenue. The curve in Figure 2 could be plotted by varying a product tax
rate against the price elasticity of demand for that product, or by plotting
capital tax rates against the elasticity of savings with respect to the net—of—
tax return to capital. The latter example was attempted with the empirical
model, but no prohibitive area was discovered.--' For this reason, the example
used here is the labor tax against the labor supply elasticity.
In our basic model, the tax on labor used by industry averages 10% of
net payments to factors. The personal income tax takes another 1% to 40% of
marginal labor income, depending on the consumer's marginal tax bracket. The
total wedge thus ranges from 11% to 50% of labor income.' One problem with
interpreting a general formulation like the Laffer curve is that either average
or marginal tax rates might be applicable. The average rates are needed to
dterm1ne total revenues, but marginal rates are more important for incentive
effects. A solution is to vary the industrial labor tax rate of 10% since
this rate is both average and marginal. Variations in this rate alone are re-
ported below, but the reader should remember that the additional wedges created
by the personal income tax and other taxes always remain. The tax wedges re-
ported are thus understatements of the model's true wedge.'
The consistent 1973 data set, with adjustments described above, also shows a— 12—
Table1
TotalRevenue Associated with each Labor TaxRate,in
Billions of 1973 Dollars
Labor SupplyElasticitywith RespecttoNet—of—Tax Wage
Rateon Rate on
Net Income Gross Income .15.501.001.501.752.002.503.004.00
—.10 —.111 341.79
.00 .000 355.82365.57
.05 .048 354.00357.46 360.56365.93
.10 .091 360.00360.00 360.00360.00 360.00 360.00 360.00 360.00 360.00
.15 .130 364.00 361.98 358.23 349.18
.20 .167 369.80 365.17 360.85
.25 .200 370.82363.62 356.91
.30 .231 439.48 391.82 369.60 350.57 295.40
.40 .286 396.49 361.52
.45 .310 396.60
.50 .333 503.71 395.43
.60 .375 389.75
.70 .412 555.56474.13 380.36
.90 .474 597.41 481.65
.95 .487 481.98
1.00 .500 615.16 481.78 336.60















Simulationswere made selectively to save computational expense. Not all possible rates are
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totaltax revenue of $360 billion compared to a national income of $1,252
bi11ion.-' These valuesare replicated for any possible labor supply elas-
ticity as long as tax rates are unchanged. Simulations with labor tax rates
other than 10% will have revenues which depend on the elasticity. Additional
revenues are rebated to consumers in lump—sum fashion, in proportion to their
original after—tax income. These rebates are necessary because general equi—
librium conditions require a balanced government budget, and increases in
government purchases would influence the equilibrium solution)'
The results from over sixty simulations are summarized in Table 1.-u-" The
first column shows the total revenue resulting from different labor tax rates
using the basic-model!s value of .15 for the labor supply elasticity with re-
spect to the net—of—tax wage. The "observed" total revenue of $360 billion
corresponds to the basic tax rate of 10%, and total revenues are positively
related to tax rates up to a tax which is 255% of net labor income, or 71.8%
of gross Beyond that rate, revenues start to fal1.'
Any column of data from Table 1 can be used to plot an example of
Figure 1, as done in Figure 3 for the .15 elasticity. In any of these Laffer
curve diagrams, the modelled U. S. economy is represented by .10 on the laborS
tax rate axis. If the various tax rates, transfers, and elasticities are
reasonable as modelled, then the U. S. economy is well down the normal range
of the curve. For those who prefer a high elasticity, Figure 4 plots another
Laffer curve. The 4.0 labor supply elasticity and current tax rates place
the U. S. well onto the prohibitive range.21
Underlined in each column of Table 1 is the maximum revenue point for
that elasticity. These tax rate and elasticity combinations correspond to
points on a curve like Figure 2. When plotted for this example, the curve is
shown in Figure 5. On this curve, with tax .rates as modelled, the labor sup—— 17—
plyelasticity would have to be at least 2.5 to put us over the peak and onto
the prohibitive range. Alternatively1, if the supply elasticity is at least
1.0 and the tax rate is at least 30% (In addition to the personal rates from
1% to 40%), then again we could be operating irrationally. The continuum of
Figure 5 allows the reader to select a plausible tax rate and elasticity com-
bination to determine whether the U. S. is now in the prohibitive area.
6. What is the Labor Supply Elasticity?
The empirical model was fairly careful in establishing all of the basic
tax rates, including the .10 labor tax rate, but it is much less explicit
about the aggregate labor supply elasticity. The econometric literature gives
many estimates for population subgroups, since different individuals will
typically have different rates of response to a new net—of—tax wage. Finegan's
(1962) occupational study found managers, craftsmen, and clerical workers
varying from a —.29 to a +.42 labor supply elasticity, while Boskin's (1973)
division by sex, race, and age found estimates from —.07(for prime—age white
males) to a +1.60 (for elderly black women). Since taxes do not distinguish
among these characteristics, the relevant elasticity parameter is an aggregate
one. Table 2 summarizes a number of econometric studies and is based mostly
on discussion in Killingsworth (1976).
There is a certain injustice to these authors in reporting their results
in such sunmiary fashion. Each study has its own measure of thewage, its own
data—year or time—period, its own mean values, and its own functional forms.
The studies differ as to how they account for labor participation rates and
as to whether they account for the balanced budget effects of government
spending as discussed above. The numbers in Table 2 are only provided to give
the reader a framework for choosing a plausibleaggregate labor supply elas—— 18—
Table2
Estimates of the Uncompensated Labor Supply Elasticity
Rangeof
Authors Data Subset Iype of Data Estimates
A. For-male
Finegan (1962) Male family heads Inter—occupational —.35 to —.25
Rosen(1969) Male family heads Inter—Industrial —.30 to —.07
Xalachek—Rajnes(1970) Male family heads U. S. cross—section +.05 to +.30
(1970)
Owen (1971) Male family heads V. S. time—series —.24 to —.11
Greenburg—Kosters Poor male family heads U. S. cross—section —.16to —.05
(1973)
Boskin (1973) Different male subgroups U. S. cross—section —.07 to +.18
Hill(1973) Poor male familyheads U. S. cross—section —.32 to —.07
Ashenfelter—Heckman Male family heads U. S. cross—section —.15
(1973)
Fleisher—Parsons—PorterMale ages 45—59 U. S. cross—section—.25 to —.10
Ashemfelter—Reckinan Married males U. S. cross—section Zero
(1974)
B. For females
Pinegan (1962) Females Inter—occupational
—.095
Leuthold (1968) Females U. S. cross—section —.067
Ralachek—Rajnes Females U. S. cross—section+.20 to +.9Q
(1970)
Boskin(1973) Different femalesubgroupsV. S. cross—section —.04 to + 1.60
Ashenfelter—Recknian Married females U. S. cross—section .87
(1974)
Aggregate
Winston (1966) Aggregate International cross— —.11to —.05
section
Lucas—Rapping (1970) Short rim aggregate Time—series 1.35 to 1.58
Lucas—Rapping (1970) Long rim aggregate Time—series Zero to 1.12— 19—
ticity.Since few aggregate studies are available, male and female estimates
can be roughly combined.
Elasticity estimates for males are mostly small and negative, ranging from
—.40 to zero. Borjas and Heckman (1978) review the econometrics of these
studies and reduce the bounds to —.19 and —.07. The estimates for females
are more often positive, and can be large in absolute value. Killingsworth
finds that females' elasticity estimates are mostly between .20 and .90 in
cross—section studies. To obtain the model's .15 aggregate labor supply elas-
ticity, perform a rough numerical calculation. The Statistical Abstract shows
that the median money income of male employed civilians has consistently been
twice that of females. It also shows about a 1.7 ratio of males to females
in the labor force, a ratio which is decreasing with t1me In any case, the
ratio of male to female income should be at least 3.0 (though decreasing).
Taking a relatively high male elasticity of —.10 and a relatively high female
elasticity of +.90, the three—to—one weighted average is a .15 aggregate
elasticity.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates a number of analytical and empirical arguments
about the relationship between tax rates and government revenues. A general
equilibrium tax model was used to plot this relationship as well as another
relationship between tax rates and factor supply elasticities. This new curve
'shows that the U. S. economy could conceivably be operating in the "prohibi-
tive range" for a national tax on labor income, but that tax rates and/or labor
supply elasticities would have to be very high for that possibility to occur.
Available evidence about the value of the relevant elasticity parameter does
not support the view that our government is currently behaving irrationally— 20—
withrespect to that tax.
The tax rate and elasticity relationship can be applied to other federal,
state, or local taxes to find circumstances where a particularly high tax
rate on real income and/or a high elasticity could place a tax in the prohibi-
tive area. The tax on purely nominal capital gains, for example, or the under
allowance of depreciation can result in high tax rates on real capital income.
These accounting procedures and nominal personal income tax brackets should be
adjusted for inflation by indexing. The "marriage penalty" which places a
secondary worker in the higher marginal tax bracket of his or her spouse may
represent another high rate of tax on an elastically supplied factor. The
"notch" effect of welfare recipients who become ineligible at a given income
level results in implicit marginal tax rates of 100% or higher. Also, the
high elasticity argument is particularly applicable for state and local gov-
ernments since factors are generally more mobile within national boundaries.
McGuire and Rapping (1968, 1970) find labor supply elasticities of 20 to 100
for particular states or industries. This mobility implies that one juris-
diction cannot charge higher tax rates than its neighbors, and it applies in-
creasingly to international factor flows. These latter considerations do not
confirm the existence of a tax on the prohibitive range, but they make one much
more plausible.
Finally, though the results of this paper tend to reject the notion of
an inverse relationship between major U. S. taxes and government revenues,
they do not necessarily invalidate the claim that these taxes should be lowered.
Even on the normal range, taxes may be higher than desired by voters. Pref-
erences can change over time, fewer public goods may now be demanded, and the
electorate can legitimately request a tax decrease. Though incentive effects— 21—
canstill be important without perverse revenue effects, the point is that
the "economics of the tax revolt" are less the economics of Incentive ef-
fects and more the economics of public choice.Footnotes
1. The tax rate of Figure 1 generally refers to any particular tax instru-
ment, while revenues generally refer to total tax receipts. Thus we
must account for the effect of one tax on all other tax bases. An
increase in the payroll tax rate, for example, could affect not only
its own revenue, but work effort and income tax revenues.
2. Michael Kinsley (1978) correctly claims that there is no logical neces—
sity for revenues to be zero at 100% tax rates, due to nonmonetary in-
centives for work effort, but he incorrectly infers that "there's no
logical reason to assume without proof that the Laffer curve ever reverses
direction at all." Laffer (1978) points out that there must be some higher
rate where economic activity goes to zero. "If every time a person goes
to the office he receives a bill from the government instead of receiving
a check from his employer, sooner or later even the wealthiest and most
highly motivated will stop going to the office. There won't be any
earnings, and total government revenue will equal zero. For the sake of
argument, imagine the government collects zero revenue at 100 percent
tax rates." The quote in the text is from "Statement Prepared
for the Joint Economic Committee Hearings on the Macroeconomic Impact
of the Administration's National Energy Plan," May 20, 1977, reprinted
in Laffer and Seymour (1979).
3. Several papers have described models in which there exists the possibility
of a prohibitive range. See Canto, Laffer and Odogwu (1977) and Canto,
Joines and Laffer (1978). Other empirical papers have found examples of
local governments operating in this range. See Grieson et al (1977) and
Ronald E. Grieson (1979). Estimates from DRI, Wharton, and Chase Econo-
metric models are also provided in Kiefer (1978). None of these papers
plot out the Laffer curve however, or estimate its relationship to various
elasticity parameters. As shown below, an open economy like a local gov-
ernment is more likely to be burdened with a ceiling on revenues.
4. In general, the location of the curve depends on consumption parameters,
production-parameters, and other circumstances in the economy. In war-
time, for example, individuals might be willing to work harder at higher
tax rates to generate larger tax revenues. Later sections estImate the
curve with a model of the 1973 U. S. economy.
5. Other interesting claims of Wanniski include Cd) "if the tax rate is
zero ... productionis maximized," and (e) "revenues and production are
maximized at (the peak of the curve)." Walter Heller (1978) has his own
complaints about Wanniski's evidence: "At a time when only a few mil-
lion Americans paid income taxes and federal spending was less than 5% of
GNP (it was 3% in 1929), we are asked to believe that federal income tax
cuts alone powered the growth of GNP from $70 billion in 1921 to $103
billion in 1929." Arthur Laffer, on the other hand, calls it "the best
book on economics ever written."—2—
6. Also, supply—side advocates typically assume anequivalence between bond
and tax financed spending, so that spending itselfcreates a wedge. De-
bates over the rationality of consumers and the net wealthof government
bonds are best conducted elsewhere. For thepurposes of this paper, I
grant this equivalence.
7. These three shortcomings of the Canto, Joines, and Laffer(1978) theor-
etical model are not explicitly corrected in the empirical modelused
below, but they are implicitly corrected through thepossibility of posi-
tive or negative labor supply elasticities.
8. Product taxes are equally relevant. Convertgeneral product taxes to
equivalent taxes on factors, or consider specific product taxesby plot-
ting against demand elasticities. Also, either a compensatedor uncom—
pensated elasticity might consistently be used as the relevantparameter.
9. This analysis over—simplified by usinga given elasticity for all tax
rates to find the revenue maximizing point. As the tax ratevaries, so
would equilibrium prices, incomes, and preferenceparameters like the
factor supply elasticity. Also, both curves areintentionally vague
about the particular tax rate and elasticity involved becausethey have
a general significance which requires specific application. Bothcurves
will be estimated for a particular factor tax and factorsupply elasticity.
10. See Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1978, 1979) andFullerton, King,
Shoven and Whalley (l979a, l979b).
11. John Whalley points out thatmany of these features provide more detail
thanwouldbe necessary to demonstrate the relationships ofFigure 1
and 2. This comment is correct, but it isanalogous to saying that a
fancy electric can—opener is not required toopen a can. My analogous
response is that if the fancy can—opener already exists, then why not
use it?
12. Effective capital tax rates are calculatedby measuring each industry's
real use of capital with replacement cost depreciation. Themodelling of
capital gains accounts for the largely nominal gains thatare subject to
tax. The combined effect of inflation and nominal income bracketsin a
progressive tax system can be modelled by increasing effective rates.
13. The difference between paying people who don'twork, and paying people
not to work is the difference between a marginalpayment with incentive
effects, and a lump—sum payment. Legally, an employee must be laidoff
to be eligible for unemployment compensation. A workercan ask to be
laid off, but employers may be reluctant to circumventthe intent of the
law. These transfers are not automatically andfully available to non—
workers. Similarly, AFDC payments are designed to selectrecipients by
particular characteristics, maximizing the lump—sum effect andminimizing disincentive effects. Social securitypayments are higher for the blind
or disabled. Finally note that these transfers, to theextent that they are
disincentives, do not always apply to marginal hours. Mostindividualswho—3—
take an extra hour of leisure do not becQme eligible fo transfers at all.
Laffer (1978) is correct, hoeve, that "if transfer payments included
'means', 'needs', or 'income' tests they too should be included."
Another more thorough study could undertake to measure incentive effects
of transfers.
14. Over forty simultations were performed in seeking a prohibitive area for
capital taxes. Using the dynamic version of the model, rates were in-
creased to 500% of net capital income (83% of gross capital income),
savings elasticities were increased to 4.0, and equilibria were calculated
out to fifty years in the future. There was not a single case discovered
where total revenues were less than the revenues associated with a lower
tax rate for the same period. Inverse relationships between tax rates
and revenues may exist for high effective rates of tax on certain types of
real capital income for certain individuals. No overall inverse relation-
ship was discovered in this model, however, because the tax distortion
applies to the savings decision, while savings are only an increment to
the capital tax base. More than fifty years would be required for the
tax base reduction to offset a tax rate increase and result in lower
revenues.
15. The model measures labor income after the industries' factor tax but before
the individual's personal income tax. Since the factor tax is 10% of labor
income, and personal tax is another 1% to 40% of marginal labor income,
the wedge can be expressed as 11.1% to 83.3% of net labor income after all
taxes, or 10% to 45.5% of labor income gross of all taxes.
16. For those who wante& a higher wedge to account for the disincentive effects
of welfare programs, the extra wedge of the personal income tax could
roughly compensate for the ignored wedge of the transfer payments.
17. Our expanded notion of welfare, including leisure valued at the net—of—tax
wage, is $1,690 billion.
18. A decrease in revenue is corrected by a similar lump—sum charge on con-
sumers in proportion to their original after—tax income, so that govern-
ment purchases still remain constant. In this sense, the model is much
like Laffer's since a change in the tax wedge is accompanied by a positive
or negative lump—sum redistribution.
19. These simulations are static in the sense that total endowments of labor
and capital are fixed. Labor can be sold to industry or retained for
leisure in the simulation, while both factors can be reallocated among
industries.
20. The tax rate on gross income (t0)isrelated to the rate on net income
(tN) by the formula tG =tN/(1+ tN).
21. The computer model provides much other information about the simulated
equilibrium. With the .15 elasticity and 71.8% tax rate, labor supply falls
off by almost half. The gross—of—tax wage rises, but the net—of—tax wage—4—
falls by 40% in the new equilibrium. 3ecause of the distortion inlabor!
leisure choices, national income falls by more than the increased value
of leisure for a net loss of $269 billion in real terms.
22. In the 4.0 elasticity case, even the small jump froma 10% to 15% tax rate
causes a 9% fall in labor supply and a net welfare loss of $26 billion in
real terms.Reeences
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